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THE INCREASING JUDICIAL RATIONALE FOR
EDUCATIONAL CHOICE: MUELLER, WITTERS
AND VOUCHERS
Since the days of Puritan New England, sectarian private schools have
played a vital role in American education.1 In early America, when all
schools were privately or locally controlled,2 parents retained greater
control over the content of their children's education. Education has
radically changed during the past two hundred years.3 In the early
1800s, the public education movement gained momentum in the states.4
The growth of large public school systems brought with it secularized
education.5
Many parents, however, objected to the increasing secularization of
public schools and desired religious education for their children.6 In
1. See generally McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 213-31 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); E. CUBBERLEY, PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1919); and L. PFEFFER,
CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 274-312 (1953).
2. In New England in 1634, the Boston Town Meeting financed the first public school from
the public treasury. A few years later in 1642, Massachusetts passed the first of several compulsory
education laws. See generally L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM (1953).
3. See generally R. FINNEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOL (1946).
4. After the Revolutionary War, education became a federal concern. The Continental Con-
gress stipulated in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 that every township provide a public school.
The Ordinance illustrated Congress' belief that the "high and binding duty of Government [was] to
support schools and advance the means of education." See C. MOEHLMAN, SCHOOL AND CHURCH:
THE AMERICAN WAY (1944).
The framers of the Constitution, however, left the authority to regulate schools to the state by not
referring to education as one of the federal government's delegated powers. The tenth amendment
reserved to the states the "powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohib-
ited by it to the States."
After the ratification of the Constitution, the states accepted the responsibility that Congress re-
served for them. Thomas Jefferson influenced many to accept the idea of public education. See C.
ARROWOOD, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND EDUCATION IN A REPUBLIC (1930). Jefferson also argued
that public education should be free from sectarian control. See Memorial and Remonstrance
against Religious Assessments in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947) (appendix).
During Jefferson's time, several states still maintained a state church and supported schools as a
function of the church. As the states evolved into separate secular entities, the control of the schools
gradually shifted from the church to the state. See CUBBERLEY, supra note 1, at 44-45.
5. See L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 281-86 (1953).
6. The dispute between New England educator Morace Mann and the President of the Ameri-
can Sunday School Union, Frederick Packard, illustrates many typical objections to secularization.
Mann, the first Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education, advocated strict enforcement of
a Massachusetts' law that barred the public schools from using textbooks that favored any sect. See
R. CULVER, HORACE MANN AND RELIGION IN THE MASSACHUSETTS PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1929).
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1925, the Supreme Court held that parents have a constitutional right to
choose how their children will be educated, and to send their children to
private schools if they choose.7 Economic realities, however, limit the
ability of parents to exercise this constitutional right. Most parents sim-
ply cannot afford private tuition while also paying mandatory public
school taxes.'
In addition to desiring control over the content of their children's edu-
cation, parents also seek a higher quality education frequently obtainable
in private schools. Many believe that public schools, particularly in in-
ner cities, provide a substandard education.' In contrast to parents
wanting religious content in school curricula, these parents simply wish
to send their children to a quality school, public or private.' 0
Many believe that a diverse educational system also benefits society by
7. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Justice James McReynolds, speaking
for a unanimous Court, said that
the fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose ex-
cludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.
Id. at 535.
Almost fifty years later, the Court reaffirmed its holding and explained that this right to choose
alternatives to public education also derived from the "fundamental interest" of parents to guide the
"religious future and education" of their children. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972).
See also State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750, 758 (1976); Diehl, The Right to
Regulate Nonpublic Education, 15 URB. LAW 97 (1983); Note, Constitutional Law--Public Regula-
tion of Private Religious Schools, 37 OHIo ST. LJ. 899 (1976).
8. A 1986 Gallup/Phi Delta KappaPoll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools
indicates that at least a narrow majority of Americans prefer private schools. Lack of finances is a
major reason why more parents do not send their children to private schools. The poll asked 1,552
adults across the nation the following question: "If you had the means, would you send any of your
children to a private or church-related school?" Forty-nine percent of parents whose children cur-
rently attend public schools answered "yes" and 46% answered "no."
Eighty-seven percent of the nation's school children currently attend public schools. With respect
to the 1986 poll, if 49% of the public-school parents prefer private schools, then 43% (49% of 87%)
of all parents prefer private schools. Adding this 43% to the 13% of all parents whose children
already attend private schools results in a rough national majority of 56% of all parents who favor
private school over public schools. See Do Most Americans Prefer Private Schools?, 1986 PHI DELTA
KAPPAN 3.
9. See Blum, Private Elementary Education in the Inner City, 1985 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 643,
644. Several years ago, the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare found that 42% of
black 17-year-olds who attended public schools were functionally illiterate. Parents of other inner-
city students made staggering sacrifices to send their children to private schools. The private school
children on the average'were several grades ahead of their public school peers. Id.
10. Id.
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advancing pluralism,1 1 creating positive competition for public schools12
and by alleviating the financial burdens of public schools. 3 More impor-
tantly, private schools also give students a nonreligious education and
thus can further the states' interest in providing a competent secular edu-
cation for every school-aged child. 4 In addition, legislators and educa-
tors generally recognize that increasing the ability of parents to make
choices regarding the education of their children improves education. 5
During the past forty years, legislatures have attempted to encourage
diverse educational systems and to provide attainable alternatives for
parents. 6 Usually, this encouragement has materialized as grants of
state aid to the private schools, direct aid to the students, or to their
parents. In most instances, the Supreme Court has rejected these at-
tempts as violations of the establishment clause because some of the aid
benefited sectarian schools. 7 This benefit, the Court has held, amounts
11. See Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1983). See also R. CAmP-
BELL, L. CUNNINGHAM, R. NYsTRAND & M. USDAN, THE ORIGIN AND CONTROL OF AMERICAN
SCHOOLS 438 (1975); and D. ERICKSON, STRATEGIES FOR PRESERVING EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM
125 (1973).
12. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983) ("private schools may serve as a benchmark
for pulic schools, in a manner analogous to the 'TVA yardstick' for private power companies");
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) ("parochial schools often afford wholesome competition with our public
schools").
13. See Mueleer v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983) (parochial schools benefit all taxpayers and
relieve public schools of a great burden "[b]y educating a substantial number of students"); Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U. S. 229, 262 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part,
and dissenting in part) ("[parochial schools] relieve substantially the tax burden incident to the
operation of public schools"); and Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973)
(overburdened public school system would suffer if large number of children abandoned parochial
schools).
14. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1968) ("wide segment of informed
opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that [sectarian] schools do an acceptable job of provid-
ing secular education to their students"). Id.
15. See Nathan, The Rhetoric and the Reality of Expanding Educational Choices, 1985 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 476, 479. A 1976 study by the National School Boards Association reported that
80% of small school districts, 60% of medium-sized school districts, and 33% of districts enrolling
more than 25,000 students do not provide any alternative programs.
A growing majority of Americans desire more educational choices. A 1983 Gallup Poll of the
Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools reported that 51% of the general public favored a
voucher plan and that U.S. blacks favored vouchers by a margin of 64% to 23%. In addition, 60%
of the respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 also favored such a plan. Id. at 477.
16. See Hoffman, Educational "Choice" Debate Has Shifted From Washington to State Capitals,
NATIONAL JOURNAL, October 19, 1985.
17. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (state could not provide sup-
plementary classes or community education classes at private schools); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
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to government "furthering the establishment of religion."18
State and federal legislators have perennially proposed various educa-
tional voucher programs.19 Recurring criticism of American public edu-
cation at the elementary and secondary levels has sustained the debate
over the efficacy of vouchers.2" This Note examines the drafting of a
402 (1985) (state could not appropriate Title I funds to provide supplementary classes at private
schools); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (state could not provide field trip transportation
for sectarian schools); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (state cannot provide counseling,
testing or teaching on private schools grounds); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973) (state could not give income tax relief to parents of parochial school children); Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (state could not reimburse church schools for costs
of testing and recordkeeping); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (state could not supplement
salaries of parochial school teachers).
But see Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (state could
provide vocational assistance to blind student preparing for the ministry); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388 (1983) (state could authorize income tax deduction for the cost of all students' tuition, text-
books, and transportation); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (state could provide diagnostic
services off the premises of the private school); Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)
(state could provide annual non-categorical grants to all private colleges to be used for sectarian
purposes); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (sectarian college permitted to borrow capital facili.
ties funds at interest rates available only to the state); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(state could provide sectarian college with funds for the construction of buildings to be used for non-
sectarian purposes), Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (state could loan free nonreligious
textbooks); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state could provide school transportation
for parochial students).
18. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
19. In 1985, the national government introduced two voucher proposals. President Reagan,
Secretary of Education William Bennett, and others advocated general vouchers which would pro-
vide education assistance to disadvantaged students. Senator Moynihan and others favored exten-
sion of Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOGs), which are currently applicable to higher
education, to include primary education.
In addition, legislators in four states have introduced education voucher proposals. Thse include
at least two voucher proposals in California, two in Colorado, three in Minnesota, and one each in
Tennessee and South Dakota. See McGarry, Family Choice in Education: Current Laws and Vari-
ous Proposals, THE CLEARINGHOUSE ON EDUCATIONAL CHOICE, July 1986.
The idea of giving parents vouchers with which they may pay their child's education at the school
of their choice has found expression in other legislation. In California, the state supreme court
sustained a statute designed to eliminate the dependence of school quality upon district wealth. See
Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976). Legislators designed the
statute to comply with the ideas of Professor John Coons of Berkeley Law School. Coons argued
that as a constitutional principle, public education must be a function of the wealth of the state as a
whole. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE III, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCA-
TION (1970).
In the early seventies, legislators in Illinois, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Iowa proposed per capita
grants or vouchers for private schools. These proposals have been termed "parochian" after the
primary beneficiaries of the legislation. See Doerr, Federal Parochaid Again, HUMANIST, July/Aug.
1979.
20. Stephen Arons argues that the prolonged interest in vouchers reflects a desire to bring
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constitutional voucher system. Part I discusses the economic justifica-
tions and educational merits of vouchers. Part II traces the development
of the Supreme Court's establishment clause test and identifies the guid-
ing principles in the court's most recent cases involving aid to sectarian
schools. Part III presents a basic voucher plan, applies the principles
extracted from the establishment clause cases, and concludes that the
proposed voucher plan has a secular legislative purpose, does not primar-
ily advance religion, and does not impermissibly entangle government
with the sectarian schools, thus meeting the current establishment clause
test.21
I. THE VOUCHER SYSTEM
For centuries, classical economists have promoted the idea of provid-
ing parents with cash grants to purchase their children's education.22
Eighteenth century theorists Adam Smith and Thomas Paine advocated
compulsory education laws and government subsidization of education
because they believed that many families would underinvest in education.
They feared that many parents either did not appreciate the importance
of education or simply could not afford it. In advocating government
subsidy of education, they proposed that the government give aid directly
to the student or parent. They argued that permitting parents to choose
good instructors would increase the instructors' incentives to teach
well.23
Basically, a voucher plan consists of a simple cash grant, or voucher,
"structural rather than particularistic school reform." Instead of focusing on classroom overcrowd-
ing and inadequate texts, reformers have been advocating "parent control, equitable allocation of
resources, and decentralization." Id. Arons participated in the feasibility study of educational
vouchers for the federal Office of Economic Opportunity. See Axons, Equity, Option and Vouchers,
1972 TCHR'S COL. Rac. 337, 339.
21. See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
22. Milton Friedman first used the term "voucher" to label these cash subsidies in his book
ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1955).
23. Adam Smith argued that government should only subsidize the capital expenses of schools.
Parents would pay the teacher's fees if the teacher's performance satisfied them. Thomas Paine
fleshed out Smith's idea and created a tax reimbursement plan that the poor could spend on their
children's education. See A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, 758-88 (Campbell, Skinner, and Todd
ed. 1976); See also E. West, Tom Paine's Voucher Scheme for Public Education, S. ECON. J. 378
(1967).
A twentieth-century classical economist, Milton Friedman, has recommended that the govern-
ment give all parents of school children a flat grant voucher to be used at "approved" schools.
Friedman adovcates reduced governmental intervention in the educational process and increased
competitiveness in the school market. See M. FRIEDMAN, The Role of Government in Education, in
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that is given to parents for each eligible school-age child. The parents
then may use the vouchers to purchase education at any school that satis-
fies the voucher system's accreditation requirements.24 Beyond these
general components, voucher plans differ according to the types of
schools-sectarian or nonsectarian-that may participate in a particular
program.2 5
Voucher proposals also differ according to which students they benefit.
In Colorado, Governor Lamm has introduced a "second chance"
voucher scheme that would permit drop-outs and drug users to choose
the school they wish to attend.26 In Minnesota, Senator Brandyl has in-
troduced a voucher program that would only benefit children of lower-
income families.27 The Reagan Administration's voucher proposal for
Chapter I aid recipients28 only benefits disadvantaged children.29
Advocates of vouchers generally agree that subsidizing parents, not
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); and M. FRIEDMAN, The Role of Government in Education, in
ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1955).
24. See Areen, Education Vouchers, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 466, 468-69 (1971).
25. One form of voucher program would permit only nonsectarian schools to participate. The
state of Vermont has employed such a plan for years. Vermont's 1977 constitution provides that "a
competent number of schools ought to be maintained in each town unless the General Assembly
permits other provisions for the convenient instruction of youth." State law authorizes the local
school boards to designate a high school and to pay a full tuition for any local student to attend it. If
a school district does not establish a high school, it must pay each pupil in that district an amount
equal to the average Vermont school tuition.
Today, ninety-five of the state's towns have no public high school and pay their students' tuition to
attend approved nonsectarian private schools or public schools in other towns. Twenty-five towns
have a voucher system for all grades, not just high school. See McClaughry, Who Says Vouchers
Wouldn't Work? 1984 REASON 24. Proponents of vouchers argue that even a voucher system that
only included piublic schools would improve education within the public system. Parents would send
their children to the best schools. Those public schools that did a less than satisfactory job would
lose students and money, and would have to improve to stay open. See Areen and Jencks, Education
Vouchers: A Proposal for Diversity and Choice 1973 TCHR'S COL. REC. 327, 329.
26. An example of a voucher system that only included public schools was the Alum Rock
experiment in San Jose, California. The Alum Rock School District agreed to implement a voucher
system that the Office of Economic Opportunity had authoirzed. The school district ran the experi-
ment from 1972 to 1977. Although the OEO's plan provided for sectarian school involvement,
sectarian schools did not participate because none in the area were interested. Also, the California
legislature did not pass legislation necessary to include such schools. See WEILER, A PUBLIC
SCHOOL VOUCHER DEMONSTRATION: THE FIRST YEAR AT ALUM ROCK (1974).
27. See The Fowler Education Proposal in McGarry, Family Choice in Education: Current
Laws and Various Proposals, THE CLEARINGHOUSE ON EDUCATIONAL CHOICE, July 1986 at 13
[hereinafter Current Laws].
28. Id. at 14
29. See THE CLEARINGHOUSE ON EDUCATIONAL CHOICE, Sept., 1986, for discussion of Chap-
ter I aid programs.
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schools, most effectively furthers the state's interest in education.30 Im-
plementation of vouchers, according to advocates, would encourage edu-
cational pluralism.31 Not only would such a system return more choice
and control to families in making educational decisions,32  but having
schools compete in a free market would also force educators to improve
the quality of education.33 Schools could more easily specialize, tailoring
programs to meet individual needs.34 In addition, some tax experts see
vouchers as a means of eliminating economic discrimination in allocating
funds for schooling. 35
Some educators contend that only a voucher plan that includes sectar-
ian schools could fully produce these perceived benefits. The exclusion
30. See Current Laws, supra note 26, at 19-23.
31. First of all, advocates of vouchers agree that education is an important state interest that
justifies public financial support. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
32. Oneresearch report showed that expanding choice among schools improves education. A
summary of 50 research projects shows that when parents and students were given choices among
public schools, the children experienced growth and achievement in all areas of development. See
Raywid, Synthesis of Research on Schools of Choice, 1984 EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 77.
33. Many contend that the political mechanisms that supposedly make public schools account-
able to parents work ineffectively. If parents have grievances, they may complain to local school
boards or their state legislature. If these groups are unresponsive, citizens can unseat unsatisfactory
members by electing new representatives. Few parents, however, have the resources to mount a
successful campaign. Consequently, school boards, educators, and legislatures have effective control
of the public schools. See Areens & Jencks, Education Voucherr" A Proposal for Diversity and
Choice, 72 TcHR'S COL. 327, 328 (1985).
This concentration of control has increased as the number of school districts has declined, al-
lowing each parent even less influence in his district. The number of school districts decreased from
127,531 in 1930, to 15,747 in 1983. The number of public elementary schools dropped from 238,000
to 58,051 in the same period. The concentration is especially overwhelming in large cities. For
example, the New York City School Board is responsible for educating more students than the
number of students in most individual states. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION,
AND WELFARE, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS (1985-86).
34. A major grievance with public schools today is that they cannot accommodate the particu-
lar academic needs and interests of individual students. In both small and large districts, a "tyranny
of the majority" bars the development of diverse programs within the public schools. One reserva-
tion school's treatment of Native Americans is an example of the public schools' failure to accommo-
date individual needs of students. The schools' textbooks did not mention any Native American
contribution in the areas of English or science. The history books described the westward expansion
as a great civilizing movement without mentioning the cultural strengths of the Native Americans or
telling about the U.S. Government's violation of treaties. After parents on the reservation formed
their own school, the Native Americans' grades, attendance, and graduation rates improved dramat-
ically. See Nathan, The Rhetoric and the Reality of Expanding Educational Choices, 1985 PHI
DELTA KAPPAN 476, 479.
35. See Arons, Equity, Option, and Vouchers, 1972 TCHR'S COL. REC. 337 ("[vouchers] are a
means of rationalizing the tax structure and eliminating economic discrimination in resource alloca-
tion for schooling.") Id. at 338.
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of sectarian schools would limit the ability of parents to truly choose the
content of their child's education.3 6 Opponents of vouchers assert that
voucher systems that permit parochial schools to participate violate the
religion clauses of the first amendment.3 7 If parochial schools partici-
pate, the government would be appropriating public funds to parents
who then buy "religious" education for their children. Appropriating
public monies in this manner, according to opponents, violates the estab-
lishment clause.3
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. The Language and History of the Establishment Clause
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."39 According to the Supreme
36. See Areen, Education Vouchers, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 466, 492 (1972).
37. The legal objections to vouchers divide into three categories: religion, race, and ensuring
quality in schools. The first issue concerns whether aid to parochial schools would violate the estab-
lishment clause. This note addresses that issue.
The second issue involves the question of whether financing education by directly paying parents
would lead to racially segregated schools. In the late sixties, six southern states attempted to circum-
vent the desegregation requirements of Brown v. Board of Education by instituting tuition voucher
programs. In this way, the state attempted to channel public funds to segregated private schools.
The courts held all six attempts unconstitutional. See Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F.
Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969);
Brown v. South Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C. 1968), aff'dper curiam, 389
U.S. 222; Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd
per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala.
1967), aff'd sub. nom., Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); Hawkins v. North Carolina
State Bd. of Educ., 11 Race Rel. L. Rep. 745 (W.D.N.C. 1966). The courts, therefore, have not
tolerated governmental voucher systems that denied equal protection of the laws. See also McCann
& Areen, Vouchers and the Citizen-Some Legal Questions, 72 TCHR'S COL. REC. 389, 391-95 [here-
inafter Vouchers and the Citizen ].
Another question is whether the government would have to exert controls to ensure the quality of
education. Those who maintain that some controls are necessary forecast two distinct problems.
First, they fear that vouchers would encourage "fly-by-night" schools. Distributing voucher funds
at intervals during the year, they argue, would prevent such schools from collecting funds and then
disappearing. Requiring certification of all school teachers and specifically defined courses would
discourage such an illusory school from even opening. Second, some argue that legislation may be
necessary to guarantee open admissions and due process protections in suspension or expulsion pro-
ceedings. Otherwise, nonpublic schools may arbitrarily deny entrance or expel poor students or
those with learning problems. See Note, Educational Vouchers: Addressing the Establishment Clause
Issue, 11 PAc. L.J. 1061, 1062 n. 11 (1980); Some Legal Questions, at 402-04.
38. See, e.g., Tractenburg, Some Problems with Family Control (Book Review), 57 TEX. L.
REv. 155 (1978).
39. U.S. CONST., amend. I.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss2/7
1988] JUDICIAL RATIONALE FOR EDUCATIONAL CHOICE
Court, the religion clauses prohibit the government from elevating any
religion to a state religion,' discriminating among religions,41 or sup-
porting any religion.42 The Court has interpreted the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment to make the establishment clause binding
on the states.43
The Supreme Court has asserted that the establishment clause erects
"a wall of separation"'  between church and state.45  Traditionally,
courts have read this metaphor as an image of government "neutrality"
towards religion.46 According to the Court, neutrality means that
"[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
40. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); and McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441-442 (1961).
41. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216-17 (1963); McCollum v. Bd. of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948).
42. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball 473 U.S. 373, 389 (1985); Committee for Pub. Educ.
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
But see Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 106-07 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); and CORD, SEPARA-
TION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION (1982) [hereinafter SEP-
ARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE]. These revisionist historians argue that Justice Black's history in
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) was incorrect. They assert that the only purposes of the
religion clauses were to prevent the federal government from establishing a state religion and from
discriminating among religions.
43. Everson v. Board. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment clause); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise clause). In Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963), the Court rejected the argument that the fourteenth amendment could not incorporate the
establishment clause because the latter was not a provision that protected an individual liberty. Id.
at 215-16.
44. Thomas Jefferson used this metaphor in a letter to a church to describe how he hoped the
religion clauses would be understood. See CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 216 (1982).
45. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
46. See id. at 15-6. The concept of neutrality is elusive. One commentator has noted that it
raises as many questions as it answers "because it depends on sub-concepts like comparability and on
definitions.., of religious and non-religious activities, on a determination whether it overrides the
policies of voluntarism and mutual abstention, and on a decision whether in any event it requires or
only permits public aid." Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1686
(1969).
A comparison of West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) with Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) illustrates the factor of defining religious practices in
applying principles of neutrality. The Barnette Court excused the children of Jehovah's Witnesses
from saluting the flag in school. In Schempp, the Unitarians succeeded in removing ceremonial
prayers from school.
"Neutrality" suggests that the law must treat the religious beliefs of Jehovah Witnesses and Uni-
tarians equally. The Court, however, followed the majoritarian view of religion in these cases. The
dominant view characterizes a flag-salute as secular but a ceremonial prayer as religious. In
Schempp, this majoritarian view justified removing prayers altogether as opposed to merely excusing
those Unitarians who objected. Therefore, "neutrality... does not assure equal weight to differing
denominational views as to what constitutes a religious practice." See Freund, at 1686. See also
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Neither can pass laws that aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another."'47 The concept of neutrality has played an impor-
tant part in the cases involving aid to private schools.48
B. The Development of the Lemon Test
The Supreme Court has developed a three-part test to determine when
public aid to religious schools violates the establishment clause. Lemon
v. Kurtzman49 produced the Court's first complete articulation of the
test. "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second,
its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion.' ,50
The Lemon test has attracted much criticism, even by members of the
Court.5 1 Without question, the test has proven a poor predictor of out-
come.5 2 At best, the test provides "no more than [a] helpful signpos[t] ' '53
for analyzing establishment clause cases. 4
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part IL The Nonestab.
lishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513, 515 (1968).
47. Everson v. Board of Edue., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1942).
48. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text for the Court's application of the concept of
neutrality.
49. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court invalidated two state statutes that authorized
salary supplements for teachers in underfunded nonpublic schools. Both programs limited the sup-
plements to those teachers who only taught secular courses. Id. at 608.
50. Id. at 612-13.
51. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (various opinions filed in that case). In Lemon,
the Court admitted, "[W]e can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily
sensitive area of constitutional law." 403 U.S. at 612. Moreover, when a case involves entanglement
problems, the Court has acknowledged "that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relation-
ship." Id. at 614. See also Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980) (Regan
fails to provide a litmus paper test any more than past cases).
52. The Court has mentioned that one of the reasons it has had such difficulty in articulating
reliable principles is that the purpose of the religion clauses "was to state an objective, not to write a
statute." Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). Consequently, "It]he Court has struggled
to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms,
and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Id. at
668-69.
53. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973).
54. Commentators also have criticized the lack of coherence in the establishment clause cases
and agree that they are difficult if not impossible to reconcile. See Lewin, Disentangling Myth from
Reality, 3 J.L. & EDUC. 107 (1974) (the Court's cases in this area resemble a "drunkard's reel");
Note, Public Funding of Private Education: A Public Policy Analysis, 10 J. oF LEG. 146, 148 (1983)
("Court has chosen to sacrifice clarity and predictability for flexibility").
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The Court, nonetheless, has held fast to this test. Attempting to clar-
ify "the broad contours of [its] inquiry,""5 the Court has employed the
test in its most recent decisions involving indirect public assistance to
sectarian schools. 6 As a result, the test remains the accepted framework
for analyzing the constitutionality of a voucher program that includes
sectarian schools.
L The Secular Purpose Requirement
Any government activity coming under an establishment clause attack
must have a "secular legislative purpose."5 7 The Court's decision in Ev-
erson v. Board of Education 51 provided the foundation for the Lemon
test's secular purpose requirement. 9 In that case, the Court sustained a
law that authorized reimbursement to parents for the transportation
costs of sending their children to public and Catholic schools.' ° The
Court characterized the aid as a general public safety law, analogous to
55. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 (1973).
56. See Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Aguilar v.
Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); School Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985);
and Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
57. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
58. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
59. Everson presented the Court with its first opportunity to develop establishment clause stan-
dards applicable to statutes providing state aid to sectarian schools. Before 1947, the Supreme Court
had few opportunities to interpret the establishment clause. See Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50
(1908); and Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
The only other case prior to Everson dealing with the question of state aid to sectarian schools was
Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). The Court avoided the establishment
clause issue by deciding it on fourteenth amendment grounds. In Cochran, the state spent state tax
funds to purchase school books for children attending private and parochial schools. Taxpayers
complained that the expenditure violated the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against taking
public funds for private use.
The Supreme Court held that the expenditure was constitutional because it was for a public
purpose:
The legislation does not segregate private schools, or their pupils, as its beneficiaries or
attempt to interfere with any matters of exclusively private concern. Its interest is educa-
tion, broadly; its method, comprehensive. Individual interests are aided only as the com-
mon interest is safeguarded.
Id. at 375. See also P. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 1,
14-17 (1961).
60. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17. Although the statute authorized reimbursement only for parents of
public and Catholic schoolchildren, the appellant did not challenge the statute on equal protection
grounds. No evidence existed that any children attended other kinds of private schools. Nor did
any evidence indicate that children would have attended other private schools if they had transporta-
tion. Id. at 4 n.2.
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police and fire protection. 61 The next state aid case, Board of Education
v. Allen,62 expanded the "general welfare benefit" theory to the broader
secular legislative purpose criterion. 63 Lemon v. Kurtzman 64 and subse-
quent cases65 have confirmed this more inclusive requirement.
Arguably, this part of the test has become little more than a formality.
Statutes providing aid to sectarian schools have easily passed this part of
the test.66 The Court only reluctantly will impute to the legislature an
unconstitutional intent, particularly when the challenged statute is
facially neutral and a secular purpose is clear.67
61. Id. at 17-18.
62. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
63. Although the Allen Court applied the Everson "child benefit theory" to sustain the program
in question, it relied on Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), for the test it actually used. In
Schempp, the Court held that devotional Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in the
public schools violated the establishment clause. The Schempp Court extracted the principles estab-
lished in the few establishment clause cases, including Everson, and formulated the following test:
"[To withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative pur-
pose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. at 222.
The Allen court adopted the Schempp two-part test as the applicable framework for establishment
clause challenges to state aid cases. The statute in question mandated that local public school au-
thorities lend textbooks free of charge to all students in public and private schools. The Court found
that the program had a secular purpose because it "further[ed] the educational opportunities avail-
able to the young." Moreover, the effects of the law did not contradict its purpose: "the law merely
makes available to all children the benefits of a general program." 392 U.S. at 243.
64. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In applying the first part of the test, the Lemon Court had no diffi-
culty finding the secular purpose. The Court noted that "the statutes themselves clearly state that
they are intended to enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools covered by the
compulsory attendance laws. There is no reason to believe the legislatures meant anything else." Id.
at 613.
65. In cases in which government was fostering religious beliefs, the Court often has used this
part of the test to invalidate the law. For example, the Court will invalidate laws requiring religious
activities at public schools because the purpose of such laws is to advance religious beliefs. See
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (state law authorizing "moments of silence" held unconstitu-
tional); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (state law requiring posting of Ten Commandments in
every classroom held unconstitutional); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (state could not
prohibit the teaching of evolution simply because it conflicted with commonly held religious beliefs);
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (practice of devotional Bible reading held
unconstitutional); and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state's recommendation that certain
prayer be recited at beginning of school day held unconstitutional).
But see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, a state university claimed that the
establishment clause mandated its policy of prohibiting student religious groups from using the
school's facilities for religious worship and instruction. The Court, however, held on free speech
grounds that a state university must permit student religious groups to use campus facilities if the
school permitted other students groups to do so. Id. at 277.
66. See infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text for valid secular purposes.
67. In Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983), the Court said, "Little time need be spent
on the question of whether the Minnesota tax deduction has a secular purpose. Under our prior
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2. The Secular Effects Requirement
The secular purpose of a statute will not "immunize from further scru-
tiny a law which . . . has a primary effect that advances religion."'68
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the Court will invalidate a
statute whose primary effect advances or inhibits religion.69 The Everson
Court's reiteration of Jefferson's "wall of separation" metaphor produced
the concept of neutrality.7" According to the Court, the state can only be
neutral towards all citizens when the "effect" of its actions neither handi-
caps nor favors religion.7 Consequently, the concept of neutrality has
evolved into the requirement that theprimary effect of a statute must not
advance or inhibit religion.72
decisions, governmental assistance programs have consistently survived this inquiry even when they
have run afoul of other aspects of the Lemon framework." Id. at 394.
See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). In that case, the Court narrowed the meaning of
the secular purpose requirement in sustaining the constitutionality of a city's Christmas nativity
display. The Court stated that it would find that government lacked a secular purpose only when
there is "no question that the statue or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations."
Id. at 680.
Justice O'Connor agrees that the purpose prong of the Lemon test requires that the government
must have a secular purpose. She contends, however, that the appropriate inquiry under that prong
"is whether the government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of religion."
Id. at 691 (O'Connor, concurring).
If the Court adopted Justice O'Connor's interpretation of the purpose requirement, fewer statutes
would survive the first part of the Lemon test. The Court would have an easier task in finding a
message of endorsement than it does in finding no secular purpose. This interpretation of the pur-
pose requirement, therefore, acts as a "heckler's veto": one person's perception of the state's activity
as a message of endorsement may be sufficient to find an unconstitutional purpose.
68. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 774 (1973).
69. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 612 (1971).
70. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying
text for discussion of neutrality.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963). According to the Schempp
Court, "wholesome neutrality" ensured the promises of both religion clauses. Without neutrality,
"powerful sects or groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious functions" so
that "official support of the State of Federal Government would be placed behind the tenets of...
orthodoxies." Id. This "fusion" would violate the establishment clause. Conversely, neutrality fur-
thers the purpose of the free exercise clause, to ensure "the right of every person to freely choose his
own [religion] ... free of any compulsion from the state." Id.
After reviewing several previous cases, the Schempp Court formulated the following test:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment ex-
ceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the constitution. That is to say to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Id. at 222.
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Although the Court faithfully quotes the "primary effects" require-
ment in every school aid case, the Court cannot agree on its proper inter-
pretation. In particular, a majority of Justices have held that the
appropriate inquiry is the "direct and immediate effect ' 73 of the aid, not
the "primary effect." Moreover, the Court tends to scrutinize the nature
of the institution receiving the aid rather than whether the aid actually
furthers religion. If the school is "pervasively sectarian," the Court is
likely to invalidate the program.74 As a result, the Court has tended to
invalidate any direct aid program benefiting a sectarian school, regardless
of whether it has a primarily secular effect. "
In 1973, the Court struck down three direct aid programs solely on the
basis of the secular effects criterion.75 The Court concluded that the stat-
utes did not guarantee that the aid would flow only to secular activities.76
In two of these cases, Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist 77 and
Sloan v. Lemon 78 , the Court invalidated state programs benefiting par-
ents of children attending private schools. 79 The New York program in
Nyquist provided small tuition grants and modest tax benefits for lower
income parents of children attending private schools. 80 The Penn-
sylvania program in Sloan provided similar grants to all parents of chil-
dren attending private schools.81 In both cases, a majority of the
73. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
74. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). In Roemer a plurality of three
Justices modified the effects test by stating that the proper inquiry was the nature of the institution.
If secular activities could not be separated from seLitarian ones, then the institution was "pervasively
sectarian" and should receive no aid.
75. See Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973); and Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
76. In Levitt, the Court invalidated a New York statute providing reimbursement to nonpublic
schools for performing state-mandated tests. The statute did not assure that teacher.prepared tests
were free of religious instruction. This lack of assurance created an impermissible potential for
advancement of religion "because the aid that [would] be devoted to secular functions (was] not
identifiable and separate from aid to sectarian activities." Id. at 480.
77. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
78. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
79. The Court found the same constitutional flaws in Sloan, 413 U.S. at 832-33, and Nyquist,
413 U.S. at 794, as it did in Levitt, see supra note 76. Both statutes had the impermissible effect of
advancing religion.
80. To qualify for the tuition reimbursement plan, a parent's annual taxable income had to be
less than $5,000. The amount of reimbursement was limited to $50 per grade school child and $100
per high school child. These amounts could not exceed 50% of actual tuition paid. Parent ineligible
for the reimbursement plan could receive tax benefits of at least $50 per school child. Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 958.
81. Parents could receive a $75 tuition reimbursement for each grade school child, and $150 for
each high school child. Sloan, 413 U.S. at 828.
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beneficiaries sent their children to sectarian schools.82
In Nyquist, the Court questioned the validity of the "primary effects"
test. Moreover, according to the Court, it is not necessary to discern be-
tween primary and secondary effects. Even if a statute has the primary
effect of advancing a secular interest, it is not immune from further ex-
amination to ascertain whether it also has the direct and immediate effect
of advancing religion.83
The Court, therefore, rejected the argument that the indirect nature of
the aid rendered it unobjectionable under the establishment clause.84
The Nyquist Court considered the direct disbursement of aid to parents
rather than to the schools as only one of many factors to consider. 85
Another factor that the Court weighed heavily in both cases was that the
states had "singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic bene-
fit." 86 This special treatment created an incentive for parents to send
their children to sectarian schools.87 The Court held both programs un-
constitutional because "their 'primary effect [was to] advance [ ] religion'
and offend [ ] the constitutional prohibition against laws 'respecting an
establishment of religion.' "88
Two years after Nyquist and Sloan, the Court appeared to abandon the
primary effects test completely by refusing to allow direct aid to nonpub-
lic schools in the form of instructional equipment and materials, that
"from [their] nature . . . [could] be diverted to religious purposes. ' 89
Several years later, the Court retreated from this standard and permitted
state officials to provide aid programs for religious schools off the reli-
82. Eighty-five percent of the private schools were sectarian in Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 768, and
ninety percent of the schools were sectarian in Sloan, 413 U.S. at 830.
83. Id. at 771.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 774.
86. Id. The Court expressly reserved the question of whether a tax exemption or reimburse-
ment plan that benefited a larger class (i.e., parents of both private and public schoolchildren) would
be constitutional. It declined to state whether a larger class would be a factor of "controlling signifi-
cance" and only said that the "narrowness of the benefited class would be an important factor." Id.
at 794.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 798.
89. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (syllabus of the Court) (instructional materials im-
permissibly advanced religion). The Court found that the secular and the sectarian functions of the
schools were "inextricably intertwined." Id. at 366. Materials used for the secular function would
invariably be used for the sectarian mission. Therefore, the program authorized "direct aid" to
religion which, according to Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780, is an impermissible advancement of religion.
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gious school property.90 The Court continued to invalidate aid schemes
that permitted private school officials to retain significant control of the
program.
91
In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan,92
the Court purported to reject the "formalistic dichotomy" of direct and
indirect aid.93 The Regan Court suggested that it would no longer invali-
date statutes because they directly fund schools rather than students or
parents. 94 The Court refused to draw a constitutional distinction be-
tween paying sectarian school teachers to grade state required tests and
paying state employees to do the same.9' The crucial criteria, according
to the Court, was whether "grading the secular tests.., is a function that
has... primarily a secular effect." 96
Ten years after Nyquist and Sloan, the Court in Mueller v. Allen 
97
upheld an indirect aid program providing tax benefits to the parents of
both public-and private schoolchildren."3 The program permitted par-
ents, for purposes of computing their state income taxes, to deduct from
their gross income their children's educational expenses.99 Deductible
expenses included tuition, textbooks, fees, and transportation.100
Quoting from Regan, the Court stated that the appropriate inquiry
was whether the statute had "the primary effect of advancing the sectar-
ian aims of the nonpublic schools." 10 1 Although about ninety-five per-
90. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). In Wolman, the Court sustained a state provision
authorizing the state to purchase secular textbooks for private schools and to provide standardized
testing and scoring services, and diagnostic, therapeutic guidance. These programs did not violate
the secular effects requirement because state offered the programs off the property of the nonpublic
school site and state authorities administered them.
91. In Meek, the Court invalidated aid for instructional materials, equipment, and field trip
transportation because they were susceptible of being used to promote religious beliefs by the
teacher. Meek, 421 U.S. 250.
92. 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
93. Id. at 658.
94. The New York legislature revised a statute to comply with the Court's opinion in Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973). The new version of the reimbursement program for
state-mandated testing provided for standardized, objective, state-prepared tests that could be
machine graded. Schools using the tests could submit vouchers recording the amount of time teach-
ers spent grading them. Regan upheld this modified version.
95. Regan, 444 U.S. at 658.
96. Id. at 657.
97. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
98. Id. at 404.
99. Id. at 391.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 396 (quoting Regan, 444 U.S. at 662).
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cent of the private school students attended sectarian schools, the Court
noted several reasons why the program did not have the primary effect of
advancing religion. 102 First, the Court observed that the courts tradi-
tionally give broad deference to legislative judgments on tax matters.10 3
Second, the Minnesota deduction was "available for educational ex-
penses incurred by all parents.' Third, Minnesota substantially "re-
duced the establishment clause objections" by providing benefits to
parents rather than directly to sectarian schools.'°5 The Court upheld the
deduction's constitutionality even though benefits ultimately went to
schools. The Court concluded that the establishment clause did not pro-
hibit this kind of "attenuated financial benefit" that flowed to sectarian
schools through "the private choices of individual parents."'0 6
Although Mueller reflects more relaxed application of the establish-
ment clause than the earlier cases, the Court emphasized that it was not
overruling Nyquist.'"7 One distinguishing factor of the cases is the differ-
ent classes of beneficiaries.' 08 The programs in Nyquist and Sloan limited
the class of immediate beneficiaries to parents whose children attended
private schools. In contrast, the Mueller beneficiaries included parents
of both private and public schoolchildren.'0 9 The Mueller Court es-
chewed any empirical analysis of which parents actually participated in
the program." 10 That the benefits were available to a broad class of par-
ents was a sufficiently "important index of secular effect.'
Grand Rapids School District v. Ball" 2 confirms the Court's reluctance
102. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 396.
103. Id. The Court noted that the Nyquist opinion expressly reserved the question of "whether a
program having the elements of a genuine tax deduction would be constitutionally acceptable." The
Nyquist deduction was not "genuine" because it was "unrelated to the amount of money actually
expended by any parent on tuition." Id. at 397 n.6.
104. The program "includ[ed] those whose children attend public schools and those whose chil-
dren attend nonsectarian private schools or sectarian private schools." Id. at 397.
105. Id. at 398-99.
106. Id. at 399. "Where... aid to parochial schools is available only as a result of decisions of
individual parents no 'imprimatur of state approval,'.., can be deemed to have been conferred on
any particular religion, or on religion generally." Id.
107. Id. at 404 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Court also did not question the vitality of Sloan.
108. In Sloan, Mueller and Nyquist, the aid was general in nature, contained no limitation to
secular use, and ultimately benefited sectarian schools.
109. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397. The Court compared the class of beneficiaries in Mueller with
those in Sloan. In Sloan, "the State [had] singled out a class of its citizens for a special economic
benefit." Id. at 397 n.7, (quoting Sloan, 413 U.S. at 832).
110. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 404.
111. Id. at 397.
112. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
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to uphold an aid program that directly benefits a pervasively sectarian
institution. In that case, a New York school district provided several
supplemental educational programs.1 13 The school district conducted
the programs in nonpublic schools, employing both public and religious
school teachers to instruct the parochial schoolchildren." 4
Initially, the Court concluded that the recipient schools were perva-
sively sectarian because "a substantial portion of their functions [were]
subsumed in the religious mission." '115 Given the character of the
schools, the Court observed that the public programs unconstitutionally
advanced religion in several ways.' 16 The Court initially contended that
an impermissible risk existed that teachers participating in the program
would inculcate religious beliefs.'17 The Court also feared that the gov-
ernment assistance symbolically linked the government and the school's
religion.' In addition, the programs impermissibly subsidized the reli-
gious mission of the schools.1 19
More recently, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected an establish-
ment clause challenge of a Washington program that provides vocational
aid to handicapped students. In Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind, 20 the Court held that the state of Washington did
not violate the establishment clause by giving assistance to a blind recipi-
ent who used the funds to pursue a career as a minister. 21 The Witters
opinion provides the question for all future cases involving aid to individ-
uals: is the program of educational aid to an individual a permissible
transfer or an impermissible direct subsidy of an institution? Given the
unanimity of the opinion, Witters in combination with Mueller provides
113. The Shared Time program offered classes during the regular school day. The school district
formed the program to supplement the core curriculum courses required by the state. The Commu-
nity Education Program held classes at the end of the school day in voluntary courses, some of
which were offered at the public schools. Of the 41 private schools involved in the program, 40 were
religious schools. Id. at 375-79.
114. The Shared Time teachers were full-time employees of the public schools. A large number
of them had previously taught in the private schools. The Community Education Program teachers
were part-time public school employees. They were full-time employees of the private school in
which they taught the programs. Id. at 376.
115. "Our inquiry must begin with a consideration of the nature of the institutions in which the
programs operate." Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 384.
116. Id. at 385.
117. Id. at 387-89.
118. Id. at 390-92.
119. Id. at 392-97.
120. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
121. Id.
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the clearest guidelines for creating a voucher system that satisfies the sec-
ular effects part of the Lemon test.
The Witters opinion centered on the effects prong of the Lemon test,
addressing the question of whether the assistance granted to Witters had
the "principal or primary effect" of supporting religion. 22 The Court
held that it did not. The Court opined that "the establishment clause is
not violated every time that money previously in the possession of the
state is conveyed to a religious institution." '23 A state employee, the
Court asserted, could constitutionally donate his check to a religious in-
stitution.124 The Court cautioned, however, that direct subsidies would
violate the establishment clause. Even subsidies in the form of aid to
parents or students, the Court continued, may constitute direct aid in
disguise.1 25
The Court detailed the factors that made Witters' aid more like the
salary donation than direct aid. First, the choices of the individual recip-
ients were "genuinely independent and private" because the state paid
the money "directly to the student who transfer[red] it to the educational
institution."126 Second, the program was not "skewed towards religion"
because individuals were eligible regardless of the "sectarian-nonsec-
tarian, or public-nonpublic nature" of the recipient institution. 27 Third,
the program contained no financial incentives for students to undertake
sectarian education because the students had the opportunity to spend
122. Id. at 486.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 486-87.
125. Id. at 487. See, eg., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977); Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
126. 474 U.S. at 487. According to Justice Marshall, this case differed from Grand Rapids,
"[w]here no meaningful distinction [could] be made between aid to the student and aid to the
school." Id. at 487 n.4 (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 264 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
Several members of the Court have indicated in recent opinions that indirect aid benefiting an
individual will have a greater chance of surviving constitutional scrutiny than direct aid benefiting
any institution. In Witters, Justice Marshall said, "Any aid provided under Washington's program
that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independent
and private choices of aid recipients." 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986).
In Grand Rapids, Justice Brennan stated, "Where, as here, no meaningful distinction can be made
between aid to the student and aid to the school, the concept of a loan to individuals is a transparent
fiction." 473 U.S. 373, 396 (1985).
Justice Rehnquist, in Mueller, stated, "under Minnesota's arrangement public funds become avail-
able only as a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children." 463
U.S. 388, 399 (1982).
127. 474 U.S. at 487-88.
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the vocational rehabilitation aid on wholly secular education. 128 More-
over, the Court did not consider the program an "ingenious" circumven-
tion of constitutional restrictions on state aid to sectarian schools.1
29
Arguably, Witters does not apply to programs that aid students in ele-
mentary and secondary schools. In Tilton v. Richardson,'30 the Court
distinguished direct state aid to colleges from direct aid to primary
schools.13 1 Younger students, the Court contended, are more impres-
sionable and susceptible to influence.1 32 The Witters Court, however, did
not discuss the Tilton distinction, nor did it expressly qualify its holding
by stressing that the money benefited only college students. In fact, a
majority of the Justices in three separate concurring opinions agreed that
Mueller, a primary school aid case, controlled the Witters case. 133 Thus,
a majority of the Court would not create an establishment clause distinc-
tion between precollege and college programs that indirectly aid sectar-
ian schools.
Another possible basis for limiting Witters is that the case only in-
volved one student.1 34 Conceivably, the Court could limit the Witters
holding and invalidate a comprehensive aid scheme. Justice Marshall,
the author of the majority opinion, indicated the importance of this fac-
tor. He stated that'the amount of state aid benefiting the religious college
was not "significant" when compared to the whole class of benefi-
ciaries.1 35 The majority's reliance upon Mueller, however, again under-
mines this potential limitation.1 36 The Mueller majority stated that the
financial benefit accruing to religious schools was sufficiently "attenu-
ated" despite the fact that parents of religious schools children claimed
most of the deductions.1 37
1
128. Id. at 488. The benefits of the aid program were not limited, "in large part or in whole, to
students at sectarian institutions." Id.
129. Id. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 785.
130. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
131. Id. at 679.
132. Id.
133. Justices O'Connor, White, Rehnquist, Burger, and Powell all relied upon Mueller in their
concurring opinions.
134. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
135. Justi- Marshall suggested that this might have been the most significant factor to him:
"Further, and importantly, nothing in the record indicates that, if petitioner succeeds, any significant
portion of the aid expended under the Washington program as a whole will end up flowing to reli-
gious education." Id. at 488.
136. See supra note 133.
137. See supra note 126.
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3. The Entanglement Principles
a. Administrative Entanglement
The Court's previous decisions make clear that a program benefiting
primary schools violates the administrative entanglement prong of the
test if the program engages public authorities in "a comprehensive, dis-
criminating, and continuing.., surveillance" to ensure adherence to the
secular effects requirement. 138 Usually the need for such surveillance
arises when two factors coexist: 1) the aid provides materials or services
that are not inherently limited to secular use; and 2) the program benefits
pervasively religious schools.139 The Court has required public officials
to monitor how the sectarian school uses the public aid to ensure that the
school does not use it to promote religion. Ironically this surveillance
may unconstitutionally entangle church and state.' 4°
This administrative entanglement factor in the Lemon test originated
in Walz v. Tax Commission.14 1 In that case, the Court used the concept
to sustain a state's tax exemption for religious property. 142 Complete ex-
emption for religious property survived the excessive entanglement test
because the alternative, taxation, entailed greater entanglement
problems."' In later cases, the Court used the test to invalidate govern-
ment programs that required official monitoring to avoid a religious ef-
fect. Aguilar v. Felton 14 is the most recent case in which the Court has
relied upon the administrative entanglement prong to invalidate a pro-
gram. Resembling the Grand Rapids program,145 the plan in Aguilar
provided supplemental classes for parochial school students in a "perva-
sively sectarian environment."' 46 The Aguilar program, however, dif-
fered from Grand Rapids because it contained a monitoring system to
prevent the teachers from interjecting religious beliefs into their teach-
ing. 147 This ongoing supervision, the Court concluded, violated the en-
138. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
139. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 411 (1985); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 361
(1975); and Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
140. Compare Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) with Aguilar v. Felton,
105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985).
141. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
142. Id. at 692.
143. Id. at 691-92.
144. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
145. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
146. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 412.
147. Id. at 413.
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tanglement clause.14 8
b. Political Entanglement
The nonentanglement test also requires that a program not have a "di-
visive political potential."' 49 The Lemon Court first articulated this con-
cern. The Court observed that in a community where many children
attend parochial schools, any state aid to such schools will invoke signifi-
cant political factionalism. Voters would select candidates who agreed
with them concerning state aid to parochial schools. According to the
Court, "political division along religious lines was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect."' 150
The Court, however, has never invalidated any state aid program
solely because of its "divisive political potential."'' In fact, the Mueller
Court appeared to hold that such an inquiry is appropriate only in cases
involving direct public aid to sectarian institutions and that it is inappro-
priate in cases involving indirect aid.'52
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL VOUCHER PROPOSAL
The probability of future experimentation with voucher systems neces-
sitates ascertaining whether a voucher scheme would survive a first
amendment establishment clause challenge. 15 Making predictions in the
abstract, however, is difficult and fails to provide significant guidance.
Therefore, the following proposal creates a workable example to address
potential constitutional objections.
A. The Components of the Plan
L Classes of Schools
a. Traditional Public and Private Schools
Existing public and private schools may choose not to participate in
148. Id. at 414.
149. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
150. Id.
151. Typically, the Court does not treat the administrative and political aspects of entanglement
as separate problems. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
152. Indirect aid means assistance that is channeled initially to parents and that reaches sectar-
ian schools only as the result of independent choices made by the initial beneficiaries. See Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1983).
153. See Vouchers and the Citizen, supra note 37. ("The ability of lawyers to predict what the
courts might do with such a radically new approach to public education is unavoidably limited.").
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the voucher program. If a public school district declines to participate, it
may only admit students residing within its district. Public schools will
continue to receive funding on a per-student basis. Parents who desire to
send their children to a non-participating private school must continue to
pay the full tuition of the school.
b. Voucher Schools
This voucher plan creates two classes of participating schools called
private and public voucher schools. Private voucher schools include sec-
ular and sectarian private schools. Public voucher schools are schools
organized as public corporations. School districts, community colleges
or public universities may establish public voucher schools. Both private
and public voucher schools may redeem state educational vouchers.
2. Limits on Regulation of Voucher Schools
Voucher schools may redeem the state vouchers of their students after
filing a statement indicating satisfaction of certain requirements. These
requirements include state hiring, employment, facilities, and curriculum
standards which currently apply to private non-voucher schools. No
voucher school is ineligible to redeem state vouchers because it teaches
moral or social values, philosophy, or religion. Public voucher schools,
however, may not promote religious beliefs. Each voucher school must
make information concerning its facilities, curriculum, and teachers
readily available to parents and state officials.
3. Eligible Students and Value of Voucher
Every school-age child residing in the state is entitled to a state
voucher annually without charge. The voucher will equal that year's
per-pupil operating cost for public schools in the district of residence.
Parents may send their children to private schools if they prefer. If par-
ents choose a private school whose tuition exceeds the value of the
voucher, they may pay the difference.
B. The Constitutionality of the Plan Under the Establishment Clause
This proposed voucher plan raises constitutional issues because sectar-
ian schools may participate. The specific question this plan presents is
whether it violates the Establishment Clause because parents may give
public funds to religious schools to educate their children. Under the
1988]
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combined holdings in Witters and Mueller, the plan does not violate the
establishment clause. 15
4
1. The Secular Purpose Requirement
This voucher proposal would easily satisfy the first criterion of the tri-
partite test. Stated legislative purposes that have satisfied the Court in
the past include the following: "the furtherance of the educational op-
portunities available to the young"; 155 the promotion of "pluralism and
diversity among. .. public and nonpublic schools";' 56 the protection of
the public school system from being inundated by children abandoning
private schools because of cost; 157 the assurance of the "full development
of the intellectual capacities of children;"' 58 and the maintenance of pri-
vate schools as a qualitative "benchmark" for the public schools."19
This proposed voucher plan serves the following purposes: to increase
the scope of children's educational opportunities; to encourage parental
involvement in education; to foster diversity and competition among par-
ticipating schools; and to offer nonaffluent families some educational
choices that are already available to affluent ones. All of the above pur-
port to improve education. These purposes, therefore, are consistent
with the purposes that the Supreme Court has previously found
acceptable.
The Court's opinion in Nyquist may create one caveat to the conclu-
sions that a court would find that this voucher plan has a secular pur-
pose. In Nyquist, the Court first found that the tax and tuition
reimbursement programs had acceptable secular purposes: "[W]e do not
question the... fully secular content, of New York's interest."'" After
the Court found that the programs violated the second prong of the
Lemon test, however, the Court stated, "[I]nsofar as such benefits render
assistance to parents who send their children to sectarian schools, their
purpose and inevitable effect are to aid and advance those religious
institutions." 6'
154. Whether the Court will adhere to the principles established in Mueller and Witters is more
problematic.
155. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
156. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
157. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 829-30 n.5 (1973).
158. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367 (1975).
159. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
160. 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
161. Id. at 773.
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The exact reason for this inconsistency in the Court's language is un-
clear. The Court may have "backtracked" and attributed to the legisla-
ture an unconstitutional purpose, having found an unconstitutional
effect. Alternatively, the inconsistency may indicate that the Court con-
cluded before it began its examination that the true purpose of the pro-
gram was to advance religion. The Court then structured its analysis to
arrive at that predetermined conclusion. Perhaps the Court simply was
not careful with its language. This inconsistency does indicate, however,
that the Court would probably not invalidate a voucher program solely
on the basis of an unacceptable purpose. Therefore, the Court would
focus its attention on the next two parts of the test.
2 The Primary Effects Requirement
The most problematic aspect of the "aid-to-religious-schools" cases
has been that the aid runs afoul of the Lemon test's secular effects re-
quirement.1 62 This voucher plan, however, satisfies the effects require-
ment. It does not have "the primary effect of advancing the sectarian
aims of the nonpublic schools," '163 nor does it "confer any message of
state endorsement of religion."' 16
The Court continually has rejected the argument that "any program
which in some manner aids an institution with a religious affiliation" vio-
lates the establishment clause. According to the holdings of Mueller and
Witters, a voucher program that "neutrally provides state assistance to a
broad spectrum of citizens" does not offend the establishment clause.165
The state provides neutral assistance when the voucher is "available gen-
erally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic
nature of the institution benefited."'' 66 If the state distributes voucher
funds directly to parents, sectarian schools receive funds only because of
individuals' private independent decisions. 67 The Court has considered
parent choices private and independent if the voucher program does not
contain incentives for recipients to attend sectarian schools. In addition,
162. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
163. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396 (1983).
164. Witters v. Washington Dep't. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 489 (1986).
165. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398-99.
166. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487, (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nuquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782-
83 n.38 (1986)). Justice Powell in a concurring opinion noted that "Mueller makes the answer clear:
state programs that are wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a class defined without
reference to religion do not violate the second part of the Lemon v. Kurtzman test." Id. at 490-91.
167. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
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the voucher plan must not appear to the Court as an "ingenious" plan for
circumventing previous decisions that prohibited state aid to sectarian
schools. 168
This voucher proposal provides neutral assistance to a broad range of
citizens. Like the recipients of the aid programs in Witters and Mueller,
students of both private and state schools may benefit from the vouchers.
Moreover, the state is not sponsoring or subsidizing religion because pub-
lic aid ultimately flows to sectarian schools. Public funds that ultimately
accrue to sectarian schools do so only as the result of the private choices
of parents to send their children to those schools.
The voucher plan contains no incentive for parents to send their chil-
dren to sectarian schools. On the contrary, voucher recipients have a
greater opportunity to use their vouchers at a nonsectarian school. A
large number of public and private secular schools currently exist, com-
pared to only a handful of sectarian schools. 169 In addition, if the tuition
of a participating sectarian school exceeds the value of the voucher, par-
ents must pay the difference themselves. Arguably, the voucher plan
contains an incentive for parents to send their children to the public
school in their district because the state must guarantee that the voucher
covers that school's tuition costs.
3. The Entanglement Requirements
The entanglement prong of the Lemon test does not create a barrier to
the constitutionality of this voucher plan. The plan does not violate the
administrative entanglement aspect of the Lemon test because it does not
involve ongoing governmental surveillance to guarantee adherence to the
secular effects requirement. Surveillance is not necessary because the aid
does not constitute materials or services that are inherently susceptible to
being used for sectarian purposes. State authorities must ensure that pri-
vate schools satisfy state curriculum, health and safety, hiring, and em-
ployment requirements. Ensuring these requirements, however, does not
increase the involvement of government in monitoring sectarian schools.
State officials currently enforce these requirements.
A more problematic question is whether the plan violates the political
entanglement prong by bearing "divisive political potential."' 170 The
168. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
169. See supra note 32.
170. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
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Court could find that this voucher scheme created "political division
along religious fines"171 if a state legislature adopted the plan to promote
the interests of religious schools. As each school district debated the
merits of the voucher system, the legislature's motive may become a
heated issue. School officials that advocated the plan could be identified
as favoring the religious schools in the community.
This debate is unlikely to occur for two reasons. First, the leading
advocates of the voucher system promote the plan to improve education,
not to advance the interests of sectarian schools.172 Although candidates
would disclose their opinions concerning the educational merits of the
plan, this disclosure would not force them to state whether they favor or
oppose aid to sectarian schools. Second, some sectarian schools may
choose not to participate in voucher plans. They fear that they would
lose their distinctive religious nature173 by accepting vouchers because
the state could more easily control their methods through additional
regulations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Parents have a constitutional right to control the content and ensure
the quality of their children's education. Economic conditions; however,
limit the ability of parents to exercise this right. Statutes that provide
assistance to private schools, parents, or students increase the educa-
tional choices of parents. Recent educational voucher proposals repre-
sent one legislative alternative to the public school system. Vouchers
maximize the ability of parents to choose between public and private
schools. Following the principles of the Supreme Court's most recent
decisions, states could draft voucher plans that fully comply with the
establishment clause. The voucher plan proposed in this Note has a sec-
ular purpose, does not primarily advance religion, and does not imper-
missibly entangle the state with sectarian schools.
J Catherine Rapinchuk
171. See supra note 149.
172. See Areen, Education Vouchers, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 466, 501 (1972).
173. See Elson, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: the Legal Framework, in PUBLIC CON-
TROLS FOR NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1969) (detailed history of state regulatory statutes).
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